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assess the impact of differences in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies as they 
reflect the case law of the Court of Justice on the freedom of establishment. It finds that coun-
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1. Introduction 
Do companies make strategic decisions to incorporate in certain jurisdictions following a 
search for the most favourable legal rules? This is likely to be the case as far as this choice 
allows businesses to reduce their tax bill, whether directly, or by benefitting from lower 
levels of transparency. As far as company law is concerned, a prerequisite for meaningful 
choice of law is the ability of firms to freely and separately choose their place of 
incorporation, regardless of the physical location of their activities. It also points towards to a 
fundamental divide in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies (lex societatis): on 
the one hand, countries that follow the ‘incorporation theory’ recognise any company 
properly constituted according to the law of another country, and accept that the company 
law of the country of incorporation applies to such companies. On the other hand, countries 
following the ‘real-seat theory’ seek to prevent free and separate choice of company law by 
determining the law applicable to a company by reference to the location of its headquarters; 
this effectively requires companies to incorporate in the jurisdiction from where it is 
managed. 
In the European Union, an interesting situation has emerged. Despite partial harmonisation of 
substantive rules, companies are mostly creatures of national law and, as a starting point, the 
conflict of laws rules applicable to companies are similarly determined at the Member State 
level; here too, they may thus apply either the ‘incorporation theory’ or the ‘real seat theory’. 
However, in addition, we also have to consider the case law of the Court of Justice, 
interpreting the freedom of establishment of Article 49 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the 
European Union. Although the Court generally does not phrase its arguments in the 
categories of conflict of laws rules, it has become clear that its case law has imposed some 
restrictions on the use of the real seat theory for companies from other Member States.  
This position became most obvious in the landmark case of Centros:1 two Danish citizens 
living in Denmark established a limited liability company (ltd) in the UK. The founders’ 
main motivation was to avoid the minimum capital requirements under Danish law. Even 
though it is somewhat unclear whether Denmark followed the real seat doctrine at the time, 
the Danish authorities refused to register a branch of Centros ltd in the commercial register 
because it did not plan to conduct business anywhere except in Denmark. The Court of 
Justice rejected this line of reasoning and held that Centros ltd was validly exercising its 
freedom of establishment and that the refusal to register was an obstacle to this freedom. 
In another case, Überseering,2 it can be seen that the consequences of a mismatch between 
the place of registration and the real seat can even be more severe. Überseering was 
established as a Dutch private company; yet, a German court held that due to its German real 
seat (and due to the traditional German use of the real seat theory) it should be classified as 
being German. Yet, as Überseering, naturally, was not incorporated under German law, it 
would also follow that Überseering would only be regarded as a German partnership with the 
result that the partners (i.e. the original shareholders) would be personally liability for any 
debts of the company. Here too, then, the Court of Justice held that an ‘outright denial’ of the 
Dutch company by German courts would violate the company’s freedom of establishment.  
                                                 
1 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) C-212/97 
2 Überseering BV v Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH (2002) C-208/00. 
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In spite of this general shift towards the ‘incorporation theory’, the European case law has 
also stated that the country of the real seat is ‘entitled to take measures designed to prevent 
certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, 
improperly to circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly 
or fraudulently taking advantage of [the freedoms]’.3 Thus, the Court of Justice has left some 
ambiguities about the possibility of corporate mobility and it may not be clear whether it can 
be said that, at present, there is a meaningful market for incorporations in the EU. 
It follows that this paper combines two questions. One of them is a question of comparative 
law, namely that it examines whether Member States have a clear-cut version of the 
‘incorporation theory’ or whether they have retained some elements of the ‘real seat’ theory 
(for details see 4.2, below). The other is the empirical question about the impact of the 
resulting differences on the incorporation behaviour of firms, and more specifically an 
investigation in the possible reasons why at least some businesses incorporate in other EU 
Member States. 
The corresponding structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
previous empirical research and the data collection of the present study. In particular, it 
explains how this paper fills gaps in the empirical literature on this topic, as it is the first one 
that assesses the impact of differences in the conflict of laws rules applicable to companies 
based on data on all incorporations of foreign businesses in the commercial registers of each 
Member State. Section 3 presents descriptive statistics of foreign-based private companies in 
all Member States today as well as times-series data on new incorporations in the UK since 
1990. These new data are one of the innovations of this paper. They also provide an initial 
assessment of whether there is a meaningful market for incorporations in the EU. The 
regression analysis in Section 4 turns to the question of whether the country differences can 
be explained by differences in conflict of laws rules applicable to companies and/or other 
factors. Finally, Section 5 reflects on the wider implications of the findings for European 
harmonisation, as well as the possible impact of the result of the UK’s ‘Brexit-referendum’. 
2. Previous research and data collection 
2. 1 Previous empirical studies 
In the US, it is well established that companies make deliberate choices about their seat, with 
the result that many listed US companies choose Delaware as their place of incorporation (for 
US-EU comparisons see e.g. Ventoruzzo et al., 2015: 35-97; Mucciarelli, 2012). In Europe, 
current empirical research is more limited. An EU study on the application of the Cross-
Border Mergers Directive explained the problems with collecting statistical data on questions 
of cross-border company mobility and on cross-border mergers in particular, as follows: 
‘Collecting this data proved extremely challenging, as the information that the 
national registries keep is partial, and the commercial databases were inconsistent 
and scarce. Indeed, previous studies on parallel topics encountered the same 
                                                 
3 Centros Ltd v Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen (1999) C-212/97 at paras. 24-25. For the subsequent case law see 
Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd. (2003) C-167/01; SEVIC Sytems AG v 
Amtsgericht Neuwied (2005) C-411/03; Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt (2008) C- 210/06; VALE Építési kft. 
(2012) C-210/06; C-106/16, Polbud – Wykonawstwo sp. z o.o (2017) C-106/16. 
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problems in gathering accurate and quality information’ (Bech-Bruun and Lexidale 
2013: 962). 
The task of collecting data on the number of companies that operate in a Member State 
different from the one in which they have been incorporated or have their real seat is also a 
demanding one. To start with, it is therefore helpful to present an overview of the scope and 
method of the existing empirical research which has aimed to tackle this problem. 
Table 1. Overview of empirical research on corporate mobility in the EU4 
Paper 
Topic / countries and 
time frame  
Methodology of data collection 
Armour 
(2005) 
German 
businesses 
incorporating 
as UK ltds 
1999 
to 
2004 
 Identified companies in the Companies House database, which 
had a largely German-language name and the name was 
ending with ‘Limited’  
 Acknowledged limitations: data merely impressionistic, 
potentially under or over-inclusive 
Becht et 
al. 
(2008) 
Businesses 
from EEA 
countries 
incorporating 
as UK ltds 
1997 
to 
2006 
 Data obtained from the FAME database (Bureau van Dijk); 
where FAME data was incomplete, correction factors were 
applied (based on a comparison between FAME and 
Companies House databases)  
 Directors’ residence as main criterion (with 50% and 100% 
thresholds) 
Becht et 
al. 
(2009) 
Registration 
of branches 
of UK ltds in 
ten Member 
States 
2006  Data obtained through field experiments with assistance from 
country correspondents who reported on their attempts to 
incorporate and branch back a UK ltd 
 Information recorded in the experiments includes the number 
of procedures involved, their cost and duration, as well as any 
obstacles encountered 
Laa-
manen 
et al. 
(2012) 
Relocation of 
HQs in 17 
European 
countries 
1996 
to 
2006 
 News databases by Lexis/Nexis and Reuters; further internet 
checks 
 Data mainly capture larger public companies 
Braun 
et al. 
(2013) 
Incorporation 
of private 
companies in 
five Member 
States 
One 
year 
+/-
law 
refor
m 
 Most data collected from the AMADEUS database (Bureau 
van Dijk); for Germany and Poland, data collected directly 
from national company registers  
 Directors’ residence as main criterion  
Muller 
et al. 
(2013) 
Cross-border 
mobility of 
SEs 
and  
transfers of 
registered 
offices 
2009 
to 
2011 
and 
2007 
to 
2012 
 Regarding mobility of SEs, the European Trade Union 
Institute’s European Company database was used together 
with the Orbis database (Bureau van Dijk) 
 Regarding mobility of other companies, national business 
registers were directly contacted, generally to no avail 
(exception: Malta); indirect data collection (matching de-
registrations with new registrations, Zephyr database used to 
track cross-border mergers) 
                                                 
4 In addition, empirical studies, not discussed here, have analysed the incorporation of businesses as a European 
Company (SE), see e.g. Eidenmüller et al., 2010. 
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Bech-
Brunn 
& Lexi-
dale 
(2013) 
Cross-border 
mergers in 
EU 
2008 
to 
2012 
 Timing of reincorporation tracked through direct and indirect 
enquiries (Thomson Knowledge, LexisNexis, Thomson 
Reuters) 
 Further information collected from various reports and the 
European Trade Union Institute 
Ringe 
(2013) 
German and 
Austrian 
businesses 
incorporating 
as UK ltds 
2004 
to 
2011 
 Data on German and Austrian companies collected from the 
Companies House via FAME database 
 Centros type companies identified if company incorporated in 
the UK with at least one German director where the company 
shares its registered office with at least 100 other companies 
(proxy for the involvement of an incorporation agency) 
Sick 
(2015) 
German 
business with 
> 500 
employees 
incorporated 
in foreign 
legal form 
1995 
to 
2014 
 Combination of primary and secondary data sources, 
including: Federal Gazette’s company reports, previous 
studies, corporate websites and other corporate databases 
Teich-
mann 
and 
Knaier 
(2015) 
Austrian 
businesses 
incorporating 
as German 
companies 
2009 
to 
2012 
 Data derived from the German Commercial Register by the 
Bundesanzeiger Verlag 
 German ‘letterbox’ companies (GmbHs /UGs) doing business 
in Austria were identified when shareholder is also the 
managing director and lives where the company does its main 
business 
Bier-
meyer 
and 
Meyer 
(2018) 
Cross-border 
mergers and 
seat transfers  
2012 
to 
2017 
 Data from 9 EU/EEA countries 
 Publication of mergers and seat transfers in official journals of 
these countries 
This literature, summarised in Table 1, suggests different proxies to identify the country with 
which companies are mostly connected, despite being incorporated in another jurisdiction. It 
has been observed that the registration of branches is not strictly enforced in many Member 
States (Becht et al., 2008: 245). Therefore, the most promising strategy is to proceed 
indirectly by examining the company’s filings in the state of incorporation. One possibility is 
to use the address of the directors as an indication of the company’s real seat. The proxy can 
be further varied by, for example, classifying a company as formally foreign if all directors 
live abroad, or if the majority lives abroad (as used by used by Becht et al., 2008; Braun et 
al., 2013). As far as the information is available, it can also be revealing to identify whether 
the managing director is also a shareholder (or even the sole shareholder) (as used by 
Teichmann and Knaier, 2015). 
Alternatively, one may go further and aim to collect information about companies without 
any physical connection of the company to the country of incorporation. In order to identify 
such companies some studies have examined whether the company’s registered office was 
shared with at least 100 other companies – i.e. it having a mere ‘letterbox’ in the country of 
incorporation. This is said to work reasonably well for the UK where registration agents use 
the same address for a large number of companies without any business activity in the state of 
incorporation (Ringe, 2013: 247), while in other countries this strategy is less reliable. 
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In this respect, a terminological and substantial clarification has to be made. In the literature, 
the term ‘letterbox companies’ is occasionally used for such companies that do business in 
one country, but are incorporated with only a ‘letterbox’ in another one (Sørensen, 2015). 
However, frequently, the term ‘letterbox companies’ is also equated with companies which 
are mere ‘special purpose entities’ (SPEs, also called ‘conduit companies’). Those too merely 
have a ‘letterbox’ in the country of incorporation, but they only hold financial assets, they are 
not involved in business activity in any country, and their main purpose is to benefit from the 
tax advantages that can be gained by using SPEs as intermediate legal entities (see e.g. 
Eurodad, 2015: 18-19; UNCTAD, 2015: 189-190). This type of letterbox companies is often 
associated with companies established in offshore tax havens, for example in the British 
Virgin Islands,5 but such regimes also exist in some EU Member States (Eurodad, ibid: 
Luxembourg, Austria, Cyprus, Hungary, Spain; also Garcia-Bernardo et al. 2017). Those 
companies are not of core interest to the present paper as, due to their lack of business 
activity, they are unlikely to raise problems of conflict of laws rules applicable to companies 
resulting from a mismatch between place of incorporation and real seat. 
2.2  Data collection of this study 
EU law requires the registration of companies in the commercial registers of the Member 
States, and as of June 2017, those registers are interconnected at EU level as part of the 
Business Registers Interconnection System (BRIS).6 At present, however, the commercial 
registers do not provide researchers with deep-level access to company data from all Member 
States. While it is possible to identify the websites of the commercial registers,7 searching for 
data about all companies established in the EU presents various practical problems: the 
websites are usually only available in the official language of the country in question and its 
search functions are often very limited. Furthermore, deep-level access to the information that 
is of interest to this study, such as the nationality and addresses of directors, is not freely 
available but instead is typically charged per access to information on each individual 
company. It is therefore not feasible to compile a comprehensive dataset of the millions of 
European companies through the websites of the commercial registers.  
A more promising path is to make use of the commercial databases provided by Bureau van 
Dijk (BvD). Some of those databases cover company data for specific countries,8 but, for our 
purposes, it is helpful that all of the national databases of European countries are integrated in 
the BvD’s general database Orbis.9 Since Orbis is composed of information from various 
domestic sources, the completeness of the information varies between countries. For most 
Member States, the coverage of the companies included is good (see also 3.1 and 4.1, below), 
                                                 
5 As discussed, following the leaked information from the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, see eg ‘Pan-
ama Papers: How assets are hidden and taxes dodged’ (BBC News, 3 April 2016), available at 
www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-35943740. 
6 The former is based on according to Directive 2009/101/EC, art. 3 and the latter on Directive 2012/17/EU and 
the Commission implementing regulation (EU) 2015/884. For the BRIS see also https://e-
justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_at_european_level-105-en.do. 
7 List of register provided at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_business_registers_in_member_states-106-en.do 
and www.ebr.org/index.php/member-countries/. 
8 See www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/data/national. 
9 The other general BvD database, focussing on European data, is Amadeus; however, Orbis is more frequently 
updated. 
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but there are some exceptions. The most notable one concerns the Greek data where many 
companies are missing. A query to BvD confirmed that their data only cover about 5% of the 
active businesses in Greece. 
The present analysis focuses on private companies, since, in the EU, it is mainly those 
companies that have shown to be interested in foreign incorporations.10 These are often very 
small businesses with no cross-border business activities; for example, in the list of UK ltds 
established by German nationals we find many small businesses such as hairdressers and 
plumbers. This limitation also implies that, in the present case, businesses are unlikely to face 
problems due to a possible divergence between the conflict of laws rules of their (real and/or 
statutory) seat and the place of any further business activities. Yet, from a wider policy 
perspective, it is also important to note that the relevance of multiple places of business 
activity may support the need for common EU rules in this area of law (see 5., below). 
Orbis has a search function that allows for the search of ‘standardised legal forms’, but it is 
more reliable to choose manually the precise types of company for each of the Member 
States. This led to a list of 14.7 million private companies incorporated in all Member States. 
Subsequently, we restricted the search to those companies where at least one director or 
senior manager is from a foreign country. For our purposes, it makes sense to exclude 
someone who runs a business in another Member State but establishes a company in his or 
her country of nationality. In the regression analysis (see 4., below), we are interested in 
persons who want to incorporate companies in another Member State despite having no 
special attachment to that country. The situation is different for nationals of that other 
country. For example, the control variable of a common language can be one of the variables 
explaining why a businessperson from Portugal may not incorporate a Finnish company, but 
this argument would not apply if this person were a Finnish national who runs his or her own 
business in Portugal with a company incorporated in Finland. 
This search operation reduced the number of private companies available to a manageable 
size of 1.1 million companies. We also had to check to what extent this might exclude 
relevant information. In total, 63% of the private companies from all Member States provide 
information about the nationality of their directors and senior managers. For 13 of the 28 
Member States, however, less than 50% of the companies include such information. 
However, generally speaking, for those countries any other information that may be helpful 
for the purposes of the present research is even less likely to be available in Orbis. Thus, the 
best that can be done is to use means of extrapolation as far as the data are incomplete, and, 
in the regression analysis, include control variables for the proportion of companies included 
in the dataset. We also checked for the robustness of any findings by way of excluding the 
countries where only limited data are available (see 3.1 and 4, below). 
In the Orbis search results, we selected a number of fields relevant for the purposes of our 
research, also considering the proxies suggested by previous research (see 2.1, above). Thus, 
for the main parts of the analysis, we downloaded information about (i) the address and 
contact details of the company, (ii) the number of current directors and managers, their 
nationality, place of residence and job title, and (iii) the nature of the company’s 
                                                 
10 See Table 1, above. This is different from the situation in the US where the market of incorporations is mainly 
– though not only, see Dammann and Schündeln (2013) – about re-incorporations of larger listed companies. 
For the law of the EU Member States on re-incorporations see Gerner-Beuerle et al. 2018a. 
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shareholders, namely whether they are also the directors or senior managers of the company 
and whether they are natural or legal persons. While it would be interesting to have further 
details about the companies in question, for example, their employees and their business 
locations, those data are rarely available for private companies. 
The Orbis category ‘directors and managers’ does not disclose which positions Orbis 
classifies under this heading. For most private companies, the main persons reported here are 
the executive directors/managers, but for some of the bigger private companies it may also 
include other managers with the authority to act on behalf of the company.11 We suggest that 
it is justifiable to consider all of these positions in order to identify the companies of interest 
in this paper since they can be indicators of the ‘real seat’ of a company. For the companies 
established in the UK, we also filtered the search results so as to only include the companies’ 
directors, but the actual findings were very similar – with a correlation of close to 0.99.12 
Some of the current empirical literature examines not the total number of incorporated 
companies but the new incorporations in a particular year (e.g., Becht et al., 2008; Braun et 
al., 2013). For the purposes of the present study, we aimed to identify all new foreign 
incorporations from 1990 to 2015. Using the ‘segmentation by year’ function provided by 
Orbis, this can, in principle, be achieved without downloading all of the data.13 However, 
sufficiently long and reliable times-series data are only available for few of the Member 
States, notably the UK. We will therefore only use times-series data for parts of subsequent 
analysis (see 3.1 and 3.3, below). 
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1 Estimation of foreign-incorporated companies 
While Orbis is a valuable global resource for information about companies, any search for 
specific details has to address its variations in data availability: variations between countries 
but also those between the relevant information about directors and senior managers (in the 
following, the term ‘managers’ will be used to refer to both of these groups). We therefore 
ascertained that for ten Member States less than 50% of the companies with at least one 
foreign manager provide information about the residence of at least one manager. In addition, 
as far as information is included in the Orbis data, it is often not useful since it does not 
mention the private address of the manager but simply restates the company’s address.  
Thus, instead of the residence of managers, the following analysis is based on their 
nationality. Moreover, the Orbis categories ‘managers being shareholders’ and ‘shareholders 
being natural or legal persons’ may be relevant since the foreign-incorporated companies that 
                                                 
11 Since this paper is concerned with private companies, the problem did not arise whether this category would 
also include the members of supervisory boards of some public companies (such as the Aufsichtsrat in the Ger-
man Aktiengesellschaft). 
12 Correlation of 0.9889 between (i) the 27 observations that count the number of ltds that have a board of direc-
tors only consisting of persons from one of the other 27 Member States and (ii) the 27 observations that count 
the number of ltds where all ‘directors and managers’ are from one of the other 27 Member States. 
13 While Orbis only allows the search of companies with at least one director/senior manager from a particular 
country, it is possible to search for all companies with any directors from all countries of the world with the ex-
ception of this particular country, which can then be deducted from the total number of companies with infor-
mation about the nationality of directors/senior managers. 
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are of interest for this study are typically companies where natural persons are the main 
shareholders as well as the managers of the company. The information about ‘managers being 
shareholders’ is particularly well reported; thus, it will be used in the following in order to 
capture ‘Centros-type’ companies and exclude group structures such as the aforementioned 
special purpose entities (see 1. and 2.1, above). 
Table 2: Top-ten target countries of businesses incorporated in other Member States 
(estimation of all companies excluding companies established by residents) 
Country  Number of companies Multiplicator 
1. UK 227,064 1.733 
2. Estonia 33,524 7.427 
3. Romania 30,123 1.013 
4. France 27,029 25.157 
5. Slovakia 26,600 1.817 
6. Luxembourg 10,631 4.548 
7. Czech Republic 8,923 1.030 
8. Ireland 8,058 2.509 
9. Germany 7,866 1.586 
10. Cyprus 4,886 11.323 
All Member States 420,429  
Note: the ‘multiplicator’ corrects for variations in data availability 
(higher values indicate less reliable data) 
Table 2 presents the estimated top-ten target countries. Following on from the considerations 
about possible proxies and data availability, it is based on companies with all managers being 
from a Member State other than the country of incorporation and the majority of those 
managers being shareholders. The raw target data have been extrapolated to estimate the total 
number of those companies across Member States, using the multiplicator. Subsequently, 
based on migration data provided by the UN, it has been estimated how many of the 
companies have been established by foreigners who are resident in the country of 
incorporation, a figure deducted from the number in the target data.14 
In order to check the robustness of this nationality-based method of establishing foreign-
incorporated companies, we compared our findings with the study of UK incorporations in 
the years 1997 to 2006 by Becht et al. (2008). For UK companies established in those years, 
it was still common to indicate the actual address of managers in the commercial register. 
Thus, we could compare the Becht et al. data with our time series (see 3.3, below) of foreign 
UK incorporations, the latter being based on the nationality of managers but then deducting 
the number of companies which were likely to be established by foreigners, resident in the 
UK at the time of incorporation (again, using the UN migration data). Both datasets are 
highly correlated (0.986) which gives us confidence in our technique of identifying 
companies established by foreigners who also live in their respective country of nationality. 
                                                 
14 Thus, the following formula was used for each country pair with I = country of incorporation and M = country 
of managers: absolute value (raw data – migrants from M in I * companies per capita in I). The population data 
are from ww.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates15.shtml. 
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3.2 Interpretation and network presentation 
In substance, Table 2 shows that the UK is by far the most popular target country, accounting 
for about 50% of the foreign incorporations. The UK is followed by four Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries in the top seven (Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Czech 
Republic), as well two further common law countries (Ireland and Cyprus) and three Western 
European countries (France, Luxembourg and Germany). 
Generally speaking, it is doubtful why, in the EU, law makers may want to attract foreign 
incorporations. Member States lack the financial incentives that have influenced Delaware in 
the market for incorporations in the US. Usually, no periodic franchise tax or similar charge 
is levied by EU Member States, and when a company is founded, only administrative costs 
are typically charged. In principle, no other fiscal motives exist, since, usually, factors largely 
equivalent to the ‘real seat’ concept are decisive for the determination of a company’s tax 
domicile. Moreover, irrespective of the legal structure, physical permanent establishments are 
generally taxed based on their location. For the individual Member States, accordingly, there 
remains, on the one hand, a possible prestige gain as a non-material advantage. On the other, 
Member States where foreign firms choose their registered seat may profit from more clients 
for lawyers and other consultants, thus collecting more taxes and creating more jobs (for all 
of these considerations see Siems, 2008: 321-2). 
There are, however, also some reasons why it is plausible that some CEE countries have 
become popular target countries for foreign incorporations. After the fall of communism, the 
business laws of the CEE countries went through various phases of reform, thereby 
increasing the potential of some of them to attract foreign incorporations. An internet search 
also shows a number of web sites that promote incorporation of businesses in Estonia, 
Romania and Slovakia.15 Moreover, it is likely that the situation in the CEE countries is not 
only about matters of company law, but is also related to other areas of law such as 
favourable tax and labour laws. It may also be noted that, given the dearth of data provided 
by private companies, we cannot be sure about the precise location of a company’s business 
operations, while typically those companies will be businesses that merely operate locally. 
For example, we may think about the situation of a Finnish businesswoman who registers a 
private company in Estonia and rents an office there, but keeps her own residence in Finland 
from where she manages the company. Such a scenario is therefore different from that of a 
company with no physical connection to the country of incorporation. However, such 
companies are also of interest for the purposes of this paper since the Finnish businesswoman 
could also have incorporated the company in Finland while merely renting an office in 
Estonia. In other words, the question of how far the place of incorporation is a deliberate 
choice – and therefore the impact of differences in conflict of laws rules – is also relevant in 
this scenario. 
To get a fuller picture of the relationship between origin and target countries, it is necessary 
to consider the information for all countries, namely the matrix of each pair of possible 
countries which leads to 28 x 27 = 756 observations. This information can be presented as a 
network. Such a network presentation is helpful as it enables us to see whether cases of 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., www.estoniancompanyregistration.com/, www.companyincorporationestonia.com/, www.romania-
company.com/, www.theromanianclub.com/, www.slovenskespolocnosti.sk/en, http://zugimpex.com/slovakia-
company.html. 
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foreign incorporations are isolated or widespread (and thus, in the latter case, indicating that 
there may be an emerging market for incorporations in the EU). 
Figure 1: Network of businesses incorporated in other Member States 
 
Note: ties present 50 or more businesses incorporated abroad based on estimation of foreign-
incorporated companies (as explained in previous section) 
Figure 1 displays all of the country pairs that have a tie-strength of at least 50: i.e., based on 
the estimated figures, there are at least 50 businesses from the origin country that incorporate 
a company in the target country.16 The direction of the arrows indicates which country is the 
origin and which is the target country. The network analysis program was also instructed to 
shift the position of countries according to the strength of their relationships using the 
technique of ‘spring embedding’. The figure shows that the UK is the centre of this mobility 
network. Many of the other close connections match geographic and linguistic similarities 
(e.g., Cyprus and Greece; the Czech Republic and Slovakia; Slovenia and Croatia; Sweden, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania).  
                                                 
16 The shading of the nodes indicates the geographic classification into Eastern, Northern, Southern and Western 
European countries, based on the classification scheme of the UN Statistics Division, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm. 
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Table 3: Clusters of legal systems based on foreign incorporations 
Clusters Countries 
2 
(R2=0.053) 
AT BG CZ FR DE HU IE IT NL PL PT 
RO SK ES UK 
BE HR CY DK EE FI EL LV LT LU MT SI SE 
3 
(R2=0.101) 
AT BE CY CZ EL HU LU 
SK SI 
HR DK EE FI LV LT MT SE BG FR DE IE IT NL PL PT 
RO ES UK 
4 
(R2=0.146) 
AT BE CZ DE 
HU LU SK 
DK EE FI LV LT 
NL SE 
BG FR IE IT PL RO ES 
UK 
HR CY EL MT PT SI 
5 
(R2=0.190) 
AT HR CZ 
HU SK SI 
EE FI LV 
LT SE 
FR DE IE IT PL 
RO UK 
BG CY DK EL NL BE LU MT PT ES 
6 
(R2=0.232) 
FR IE IT 
PL RO UK 
CZ HU SK 
SI 
EE FI LV 
LT SE 
BG HR CY 
EL 
AT BE DE LU 
NL 
DK MT PT ES 
7 
(R2=0.271) 
FR IE IT 
PL RO UK 
DK PT ES 
SE 
EE FI 
LV LT 
BG CY 
EL 
HR 
MT SI 
BE DE LU 
NL 
AT CZ HU SK 
8 
(R2=0.308) 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
CZ HU 
SK 
BE DE 
LU NL 
FR PT 
ES 
BG CY 
EL 
AT HR SI EE FI 
LV LT 
DK MT 
SE 
9 
(R2=0.346) 
HR 
MT SI 
EE FI 
LV 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
DK LT 
SE 
FR PT 
ES 
CZ HU 
SK 
BG CY 
EL 
AT DE 
NL 
BE 
LU 
10 
(R2=0.375) 
EE FI 
LV 
HR 
SI 
LT 
MT 
BE 
LU 
IE IT PL 
RO UK 
FR PT 
ES 
CZ HU 
SK 
BG 
CY EL 
DK SE AT DE 
NL 
Note: calculations based on network of the number of foreign incorporations (see Figure 1, above); 
this tables uses the official EU abbreviations for the names of the Member States as available at 
http://publications.europa.eu/code/en/en-370100.htm. 
The closeness, according to these network data, can also be established more formally. 
Network analysis provides various tools to identify community structures (Ferligoj et al., 
2011). Some of those tools rely on binary data, but for a valued network – such as the current 
one – it is preferable to use tools that consider the full information in the dataset. One such 
method is to calculate ‘optimisation clusters’. This refers to a formal method that ‘optimises a 
cost function which measures the total distance or similarity within classes for a proximity 
matrix’.17 
Optimisation clusters require that the researcher specifies in advance how many clusters shall 
be created. In Table 3 this has been done, based on the absolute number of incorporations, for 
up to ten clusters since, with more clusters, we would often only have clusters of only one or 
two countries. The table also indicates how well the respective clusters explain the entire 
dataset (R2). It can be seen that this number is low for the divisions with few clusters, but that 
it gradually increases with more clusters being added. For example, the eight-cluster division 
can then be seen as a plausible one, consisting of the following clusters (in the order from the 
table): a mixed one, an Eastern European one, a Western European one, a South-West and a 
South-East European one, a Central European one, and two mainly Nordic-Baltic ones.  
It is also revealing to ‘track’ the position of individual countries throughout the ten clusters. 
The following groups of countries are always in the same respective cluster: the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary; Finland, Estonia and Latvia; Poland, Romania and Italy; 
the UK and Ireland; Cyprus and Greece; and Belgium and Luxembourg. These groups may 
                                                 
17 Definition at www.analytictech.com/ucinet/help/2cvtid.htm. 
13 
 
be seen as intuitive ones as they are those of neighbouring countries with further linguistic, 
social and economic similarities (a point further evaluated in the regression analysis, see 4., 
below). For the purposes of this paper, however, it also shows the rather limited effect of the 
freedom of establishment of the Treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, on the mobility 
of companies across all Member States. 
3.3 Time series of new incorporations in the UK (1990-2015) 
As already mentioned (see final paragraph of 2.2, above), reliable time-series data about 
incorporations are not available across all Member States. The UK data are a rare exception. 
Figure 2 reports the time series for incorporations of foreign-based ltds in the UK (i.e. with 
all directors being shareholders and nationals from another Member State but deducting the 
companies established by foreigners living in the UK). The number of incorporations per year 
differs considerably: for example, the highest mean is 1307 (for Germany), the highest 
median is 468 (for France) and the highest maximum value is 8197 (for Romania), but for 
some of the other countries we only have single or dual-digit figures in these categories. 
Thus, in order to be able to display the data as clear as possible, the first part of Figure 2 
reports the eight countries with the highest numbers of foreign incorporations, the second one 
the next eight countries, and the third one the remaining Member States. 
Figure 2: Time series of newly incorporated foreign-based UK ltds 1990-2015  
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Figure 2 shows that prior to the late 1990s most curves were relatively flat, then followed by 
a rise of foreign ltd incorporations, first, in some of the pre-2004 Member States (notably, 
Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands and Austria), and in the 2010s across all Member States 
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(both ‘old’ and ‘new’ ones). In some Member States, there has been a rise of UK ltd 
incorporations but then also a decline, at least for some years. According to Ringe (2013), 
this happened in Germany in particular, attributed to a reform of the law of private limited 
companies (MoMiG), but our figures also show some reversals of the general trend for Spain, 
Denmark, Belgium and Austria. However, overall, the number of newly incorporated foreign 
ltds has continued to rise. Thus, we do not confirm Ringe’s assessment of a mere ‘flash in the 
pan’. 
It can also be seen that most changes happened a number of years after the 1999 landmark 
case of Centros (see 1., above); it therefore follows that this judgment alone did not give 
businesses from other Member States the confidence to establish a company in the UK. 
Similarly, it is noticeable that in the post-2004 Member States the stark rise in UK 
incorporations only came a few years after their accession to the EU. Thus, this also justifies 
a cautious assessment of the impact of the case law of the Court of Justice for corporate 
mobility in the EU. 
4. Regression analysis: do differences in conflict of laws rules matter? 
4.1 Methodological considerations 
In order to assess the relevance of differences in conflicts of laws rules applicable to com-
panies more formally the subsequent regression analysis is based on the cross-sectional data 
of currently incorporated companies. While times-series data can be helpful to establish 
causal relationships, the aforementioned limitations of data availability mean that only the 
cross-sectional data enable us to analyse the relevance of differences in conflict of laws rules 
across all Member States. Likewise, it is not possible to analyse differences at the firm level 
since, for private companies, such information is unavailable on an EU-wide basis (see 2.2, 
above). 
The incorporation data are count data. This indicates a Poisson or negative binomial 
distribution with a Generalized Linear Model (GLM). In the present case, negative binomial 
is preferred due to overdispersion, to be precise ‘negative binomial parameter estimated via 
ML’ in Stata. We use standard errors clustered by the countries of the commercial register, 
thus addressing the possibility that our data are correlated within groups of observations 
sharing the same country. 
In all of the subsequent models, we use the original data on companies with all managers 
from another Member State and the majority of them being shareholders. We then also 
control for the availability of the relevant data in Orbis and migration to the country of 
incorporation (see Table 7, below: ‘multiplicator’ and ‘migration’). This approach was 
preferred over the use of the adjusted data (see Table 2, above). The adjustment was based on 
the assumption that migrants incorporate a company as frequently as the native population. It 
is also possible, however, that migrants are more likely to incorporate their own companies 
since it may be difficult for them to find employment in the public sector or local businesses. 
Thus, the use of migration as an explanatory variable is helpful since it would also capture 
any higher (or lower) rate of incorporations per capita of the migrant population. 
In the regression analysis, we also consider the possible influence of the gaps in the data (see 
2.2 and 3.1, above). Thus, in the main analysis we exclude the six countries with the most 
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limited data (below 5%), which are Belgium, Croatia, France, Greece, the Netherlands and 
Sweden. To check the robustness of the findings, we also run regressions with all countries 
but the UK, the eleven countries with the most comprehensive data (above 50%), namely 
Bulgaria, Czech Rep, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and the UK, as well as all 28 Member States. 
4.2 Coding the law applicable to companies 
The case law of the Court of Justice has facilitated the incorporation of companies in other 
Member States (see 1., above). Still, there may be ‘remnants’ of the real seat theory in some 
Member States, which might variously refer to the location of the administrative office or 
other fact-based criterions, in order to mitigate certain effects of a ‘pure’ incorporation 
theory. Ideally, we would know precisely how costly such ‘real seat’ restrictions are for 
businesses. For example, if such a restriction meant that the board meetings need to held in 
the country of the ‘real seat’, a company may calculate whether these costs outweigh the 
benefits of a particular company law. However, data on such precise costs are not available. 
Thus, the following uses a method of legal coding in order to evaluate how far Member 
States impose general ‘real seat’ restrictions on companies under either rules of conflicts of 
laws or substantive company law. 
Table 4: ‘Incorporation theory score’ showing ‘pureness’ of incorporation theory under 
rules of conflicts of laws (private international law)  
Coding  Definition Countries 
1 
if a connecting factor based upon the incorporation theory is 
clearly formulated in legislation or through judge-made law 
(i.e. in a way that everyone, even non-experts, can grasp it) 
and no exceptions are provided (i.e. no additional connecting 
factors based upon the location of a company’s real seat). 
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, 
Sweden, UK 
2/3 
if (i) the situation that a connecting factor based upon the 
incorporation theory is clearly formulated but that this 
criterion is subject to exceptions, or (ii) that legal experts can 
identify that the country follows a connecting factor based 
upon the incorporation theory and no exceptions are provided 
but non-experts are uncertain about this position. 
Austria, Belgium, 
Croatia, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Romania, Slovenia, 
Spain 
1/3 
as in previous scenario (ii) but exceptions to the 
incorporation theory clearly exist. 
Denmark, Greece, 
Latvia, Luxembourg 
0 
scenario where even legal experts cannot identify that the 
country follows a connecting factor based upon the 
incorporation theory 
Poland, Portugal 
We classify the level of ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory in four categories, as shown in 
the definitions in Table 4, scaled from 0 to 1.18 The two main considerations are, first, 
whether there are exceptions to the incorporation theory, for example, special rules that 
                                                 
18 It would make no difference to the results to code this information as  0, 1, 2, and 3; the present use of a 0 to 1 
scale has the advantage that this leads to the same minimum and maximum values for the ‘incorporation theory 
score’ and ‘territorial flexibility score’ (both discussed in this section). 
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deviate from the primary connecting factor of the place of incorporation for some questions 
of company law (which may be allowed under EU law, see 1., above). Secondly, we code 
whether the incorporation theory is clearly and explicitly formulated in legislation or through 
judge-made law; thus, this second factors considers whether there is sufficient legal certainty 
for someone who is not a legal expert, say, a businessperson without legal training, to be 
confident about the practical feasibility of cross-border corporate mobility in the EU. 
Table 5: ‘Territorial flexibility score’ showing whether substantive company law is free 
from real seat elements 
Coding  Definition Countries 
1 
if domestically incorporated companies 
do not have to have their headquarters or 
any other fact-based criteria on the 
domestic territory 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Sweden, UK 
½ 
if domestic companies should have some 
fact-based connection to the domestic 
territory but this rule is uncertain 
Poland 
0 
if there is a requirement that companies 
have to have their headquarters on the 
domestic territory 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, 
Spain 
 
The case law of the Court of Justice has emphasised repeatedly that it is possible for Member 
States to provide that incorporations in their own jurisdiction are tied to the requirement that 
the company has its headquarters, or other physical elements, in this country.19 Thus, in some 
Member States, rules of substantive company law contain requirements for companies to 
establish or maintain a specific connection to the territory of the Member State. Table 5 
provides a definition of any such territorial restrictions under substantive company law. The 
coding template also includes an intermediate classification where the rule is uncertain; this is 
only relevant for one country (Poland) – however, we also checked whether allocating this 
country to one of the clear categories makes a difference; yet, all of the subsequent results 
remain unchanged.  
                                                 
19 This goes back to the decision in The Queen v HM Treasury and Commissioners for Inland Revenue, ex p 
Daily Mail and General Trust plc (1988) C-81/87 and was confirmed in Cartesio Oktato es Szolgaltato bt 
(2008) C- 210/06 and VALE Építési kft. (2012) C-210/06. 
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Figure 3: Map of ‘incorporation theory score’  
 
Figure 4: Map of ‘territorial flexibility score’  
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Based on the definitions of Tables 4 and 5, and with the information collected in a detailed 
comparative analysis (Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2016 and 2018b), we coded the laws of the 
Member States according to the ‘pureness’ of the incorporation theory and the substantive 
company law being free from territorial real seat elements. Any such restrictions tend to 
derive from the established position of the domestic laws prior to the case law of the Court of 
Justice and are therefore exogenous to variations in the prevalence of foreign-based 
companies today. The precise country classifications are shown in Tables 4 and 5; Figures 3 
and 4 visualise them in two maps. 
Table 6: Relationship between ‘incorporation theory score’ (ITS) and ‘territorial flexi-
bility score’ (TFS)  
 TFS 
0 1/2 1 
ITS 
0  Poland Portugal 
1/3 Greece, Latvia, Luxembourg,   Denmark 
2/3 
Austria, Belgium, Estonia, 
France, Slovenia, Spain 
 Croatia, Germany, Italy, Romania 
1 
Lithuania  Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Malta, 
Netherlands, Slovakia, Sweden, UK 
Table 6 displays the relationship between our two variables which code the law applicable to 
companies. It can be seen that some countries follow the same liberal approach for both 
questions; however, there are also cases where conflicts of laws and substantive company law 
have evolved differently, for example, compare Lithuania on the one hand and Portugal on 
the other. As indicated in the explanation for the ‘territorial flexibility score’, there is also the 
difference that the pureness of incorporation theory reflects the case law of the Court of 
Justice, while the question of whether substantive company law is free from real seat 
elements is merely a matter of domestic preferences. Overall, there is therefore only a modest 
positive correlation between these two variables of 0.37. 
4.3 Further explanatory variables 
The decision to incorporate in a foreign country can also be driven by a number of other 
factors. For this purpose, we use various control variables reported in Table 7. The main aim 
is to test whether other characteristics of the country of incorporation may be more important 
than conflict of laws rules. Further control variables account for the closeness of the country 
pairs. We also considered that the data on private companies as they exist today are likely to 
be influenced by both the recent past and the present: while the past is of importance for the 
incorporation decision, the present is also relevant since companies that still exist today make 
the implicit choice to keep the present legal form. 
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Table 7: Description of explanatory variables 
Name Description  
(for country of incorporation unless 
stated otherwise) 
Source 
Incorporation 
theory score 
‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory 
under rules of conflicts of laws 
(private international law) 
Own research, see Table 4 and 
accompanying text 
 
Territorial 
flexibility score 
Substantive company law free from 
real seat elements 
Own research, see Table 5 and 
accompanying text 
Incorporation 
costs  
 
Indicator that measures minimum 
capital, costs, procedures and time 
for establishing a company 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/explore
topics/starting-a-business  
Corporate tax 
rates  
Corporate tax rate  https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/servic
es/tax/tax-tools-and-resources/tax-rates-
online/corporate-tax-rates-table.html  
Rule of law Rule of Law score based on World 
Governance Indicators 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/i
ndex.aspx#home  
Legal origin Dummy variable for countries of 
the same legal origin (English, 
French, German and Nordic) 
La Porta et al., 2008, data available at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publicati
ons/economic-consequences-legal-origins  
Official 
language 
Official language of country pairs http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/publications/
wp/abstract.asp?NoDoc=3877  
Geographic 
distance 
Distances between the cities 
constituting the economic centres 
between country pairs, weighted by 
share of country’s population 
as previous 
Population  Population (in million) http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Population_and_popu
lation_change_statistics  
Companies per 
capita 
Limited companies (as reported in 
Orbis) per capita 
Own calculations, see 2.2 above 
Multiplicator Factor correcting for variations in 
data availability 
Own calculations, see 3.1 above 
Migration Number of international migrants http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/p
opulation/migration/data/estimates2/estima
tes15.shtml 
Manager 
country score 
‘Pureness’ of incorporation theory 
in the country of the managers 
Own research, see Table 4 and 
accompanying text 
Country 
dummies 
Dummy variables for each country 
of the managers (with the UK as the 
reference category) 
 
 
Apart from conflict of laws rules, it could rather be low incorporation costs, low corporate tax 
rates and a good rule of law rating of the country of incorporation that attract foreign 
businesses. With respect to the possible relevance of corporate tax law, it is worth noting that 
the concept of tax residence diverges from the mere formal registered seat and is normally a 
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fact-intense criterion, which, for instance, considers the place of a company’s business or its 
headquarter (see Maisto, 2009). Thus, such a variable is unlikely to be significant for 
companies that only have a ‘letterbox’ in the incorporation country while doing business in 
another Member State. However, it is likely to be relevant for companies that have some 
physical connection to the country of incorporation – with the consequence that the tax 
authorities apply domestic tax law, despite the fact that the company’s managers are based 
abroad.20 Such scenarios are within the scope of the present analysis (see 3.2, above). 
More generally, it can be speculated that businesses may not choose a legal system by way of 
incorporation that is too unfamiliar to them. Thus, the variable on whether countries belong to 
the same ‘legal origin’ aims to account for this factor, using the categories of English, French, 
German or Nordic legal origin for all European countries, as reported in the most recent 
studies of this line of research (La Porta et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2003 also had the 
category of ‘socialist legal origin’). The use of this variable should not be regarded as an 
endorsement of the alleged importance of ‘legal origins’. Indeed, it is doubtful whether these 
Western ‘legal origins’ can be seen as globally valid categories (Siems, 2016). However, 
given the mere European scope of this paper, there could be still some relevance of 
differences in the historical ‘legal origins’ between European countries.  
Of course, not only legal similarities may play a role. Language could matter since 
registration of a company typically requires the use of the official language of the respective 
country. It can also be relevant as far as the choice of a place of incorporation may mean that 
the founders may become involved in legal disputes in the target country. Geography is likely 
to matter for businesses that operate in a border region – which can also mean that the main 
place of business could be in the neighbouring country. The population of the incorporation 
country could also be relevant. In the US, the popularity of the small state of Delaware is 
partly due to the fact that Delaware can focus on being attractive to incorporations from other 
states while more populous states have to balance more diverse interests. But the reverse is 
also possible: countries with a larger population being considered as a more secure choice for 
incorporating a company. This variable also controls for the effect that some of the com-
panies in question may do some business in their country of incorporation and may therefore 
benefit from the larger market of this country. 
The control variable of ‘companies per capita’ may capture a variety of factors. Some of 
those factors overlap with reasons already mentioned, such as costs of incorporation, but this 
variable also tests whether, more generally, the form of the private limited company is 
popular in the country of incorporation. To some extent, this variable may also capture the 
question whether countries attract more companies if they give preference to either the 
interests of shareholders or directors (for this topic see e.g. Fluck and Mayer, 2005). In 
addition, it should be noted that the principal-agent problems of corporate governance and the 
corresponding question about the strength of shareholder rights21 are mainly topics of large 
listed companies with at least some separation between ownership and control, whereas the 
present study is concerned with small private companies in which the majority of the 
managers are identical with the companies’ shareholders.  
                                                 
20 Or where, in practice, tax authorities are not fully informed as regards the factual connections of the company 
to another country, or are lenient in the way they apply the law as regards this connection. 
21 For one of the quantitative datasets, coding the law of public companies, see www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/datasets/. 
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Finally, as regards the country of incorporation, the control variables ‘multiplicator’ and 
‘migration’ are necessary since the regression analysis uses the original data of companies as 
available in Orbis (see already 4.1, above). We also checked whether there may be problems 
of multicollinearity; yet, none of the variables have a correlation of more than 0.5. 
With respect to the country of the managers,22 we also consider the respective conflict of laws 
rules of this country. While the case law of the Court of Justice places restrictions on Member 
States’ rules in so far as they apply vis-à-vis foreign companies, a number of ambiguities 
remain (see 1., above). These ambiguities often stem from differences between Member 
States as to the exact scope of company law, and its boundaries with other areas of law, and 
often primarily affect foreign-incorporated companies (for details see Gerner-Beuerle and 
Schuster, 2014). The existence of a ‘pure’ incorporation theory may thus not be the main 
concern for businesses seeking incorporation in a Member State, as long as any remnants of 
the real seat theory only affect companies incorporated elsewhere. However, beyond just 
measuring the closeness of a country’s conflict of laws rules to the incorporation theory, the 
incorporation theory score may well proxy for other features of a national legal system.23 
Where a national company law is designed to give maximum freedom to shareholders in the 
internal organisation of private companies, the choice of a foreign company law for doing 
business in that Member State is unlikely to be regarded as problematic by the legislature in 
the real seat state: after all, most features of the foreign company law so chosen would also 
have been available under the company law of the real seat state. Since the real seat 
doctrine’s most important effect is to assert regulatory sovereignty over all business activity 
carried out in a particular jurisdiction, thereby reducing or negating choice of law, it may be 
expected that the original choice of that approach and the preservation of some of its 
elements post-Centros correlates with the existence of mandatory rules of substantive com-
pany law which shareholders would not choose voluntarily. Thus, prima facie one may 
expect that the conflict of laws rules in both the country of incorporation and in the real seat 
state might influence the incorporation decision. 
Beyond these specific considerations, that there could be many unobservable reasons that 
may determine why people from a particular country may want to incorporate a private 
company in the first place. For example, this may be due to country differences in innovation 
or in bankruptcy, labour and social security laws. It is beyond the scope of this paper’s focus 
on the relevant factors in the country of incorporation to examine details of these laws. Thus, 
dummy variables for the country of the managers are included in order to consider any of 
those factors. While this reduces the degrees of freedom by up to 27 (if all countries are 
included, see the next section), the number of observations remains well above the 
recommendation to have at least ten observations per parameter for categorical dependent 
variables such as count data (Long and Freese, 2001: 65; generally also Harrell, 2015: 72).  
                                                 
22 Based on their nationality but controlling for migration through the corresponding variable; see 3.1 above. 
Also note that our search strategy codes a company as being based in another Member State if all managers are 
from this country; thus, we do not have companies with managers coming from different Member States. 
23 For instance, historic reliance on the real seat doctrine as well as preservation, post-Centros, of some elements 
of that doctrine in a Member State’s conflict of laws rules may be correlated with company law rules aimed at 
protecting non-shareholder constituencies. 
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4.4 Regression results 
The first three regression outputs report in Table 8 the results excluding the six countries with 
the most limited data (see 4.1, above). They are therefore based on 22 (place of 
incorporation) x 27 (place of business) = 594 observations. 
Table 8: Negative binomial regressions (1) – dependent variable: number of companies 
with all managers being citizens of another Member State and more than half of those 
managers also being the shareholders of the company 
Independent variables:   Model (1)   Model (2)     Model (3) 
 
Coefficients and  
significance  
Coefficients and  
significance  
Coefficients and  
significance  
Incorporation theory score 2.080 ** 1.470 * 2.080 ** 
Territorial flexibility score -0.818   -0.790   -0.818   
Costs of incorporation 0.104 ** 0.083 * 0.104 ** 
Corporate tax rate -0.076   -0.033   -0.076   
Rule of law -0.602   -0.725   -0.602   
Legal origin 0.764 ** 0.750 ** 0.764 ** 
Official language 1.607 ** 1.243 * 1.607 ** 
Geographic distance -0.001 ** -0.001 ** -0.001 ** 
Population (mn) 0.062 ** 0.062 ** 0.062 ** 
Companies per capita     13.935 *     
Multiplicator -0.143 * -0.315 ** -0.143 * 
Migrants 3.40E-06   3.63E-06   3.4E-06   
Manager country score     1.872  
Country dummies #  #  #  
Constant -0.447   0.630       
Log pseudolikelihood -2825.45   -2802.81   -2825.45   
  n=594   n=594   n=594   
Note: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level;  
# dummy variables for the country of the managers (individual values not shown)  
These results show that, as far as the legal variables are concerned, the incorporation theory 
score, the costs of incorporation and legal origin are consistently statistically significant, but 
not the variables on the territorial flexibility score, corporate tax law and the rule of law.  
The lack of significance of the territorial flexibility score is not implausible as it is doubtful 
how important any such restriction of substantive company law is in practice. It is not clear 
how far any requirement of a fact-based connection to the territory can be checked by the 
commercial registers – or, indeed, whether registers would have an incentive to do so. For 
example, in Estonia, which we coded as having such a requirement, the country report of the 
underlying project states that in reality ‘there is no effective mechanism that would restrict 
the foreign-administrated companies to be registered in Estonia’ (Hoffmann in Gerner-
Beuerle et al., 2018b) At a practical level, this specific insight is also confirmed by the fact 
that there are various service providers that offer quick and uncomplicated incorporation in 
Estonia to foreign businesses (see 3.2, above). 
24 
 
The variables about official language and geography are significant with the expected signs. 
In a further specificiation (not reported here), we also examined the role of the spoken 
language, but it was found to be less significant than the official language. The variable on 
population shows that, in the EU, larger countries have an advantage in attracting foreign 
incorporations. Model (2) includes the variable on ‘companies per capita’ and confirms that 
other factors may play a role for the incorporation decision. However, the incorporating score 
also retains its significance; thus, it is not simply a proxy for such other differences. Model 
(3) adds the incorporation theory score of the country of the managers. It is insignificant, 
which is likely to be the result of the complex factors that account for the choices managers 
make when incorporating a private company.  
In further regressions, not reported here, we also checked a number of other combinations 
and variations of the variables (e.g., dropping variables, such as the ones on substantive law 
or legal origin; dropping the incorporation theory score for the country of incorporation but 
not the country of the managers) without changes to the results. As additional robustness 
checks we scaled the dependent variable per capita and per log GDP and run corresponding 
regressions using a gamma GLM with log link, applied to model (1): here too the results are 
unchanged for the main variables of interest and there are only minor changes for some of the 
additional control variables (namely that the multiplicator loses its significance in the first 
variation and that official language drops to a 5% significance level in the second one). 
Table 9: Interpretation of coefficients in model (1) of Table 8, above 
Independent variables: Coefficients and 
significance 
Change per 1 Unit 
Increase (IRR) 
Change per 
Standard 
Deviation 
Incorporation theory score 2.080 ** 700.67% 213.79% 
Territorial flexibility score -0.818  -55.85% -26.54% 
Costs of incorporation 0.104 ** 10.97% 68.23% 
Corporate tax rate -0.076  -7.31% -50.42% 
Rule of law -0.602  -45.22% -27.66% 
Legal origin 0.764 ** 114.66% 52.92% 
Official language 1.607 ** 398.87% 75.38% 
Geographic distance -0.001 ** -0.13% -97.55% 
Population 6.20E-08 ** 0.00% 143.22% 
Multiplicator -0.143 * -13.34% -127.28% 
Migrants 3.40E-06  0.00% 31.68% 
 
The coefficients of count data regressions do not lend themselves to intuitive interpretation as 
easily as OLS models. However, it is possible to say that a coefficient of x means that a 
change in the respective independent variable of 1 will result in a multiplication of the 
predicted count by ex (see Winkelmann 2008: 70; Coxe et al. 2009: 124). Table 9 reports 
these ‘incidence rate ratios’ (IRR) for model (1) as well as further ways to interpret the 
coefficients of this model. The column ‘change per 1 unit increase’ enables the calculation of 
an effect of changes to this variable, holding the other variables constant. The final column 
follows the same approach but examines the percentage impact of a one standard deviation 
increase. This is the best way to compare the effects of the individual variables. It can be seen 
that the incorporation theory score plays the largest role, followed by the population, 
geographic distance, official language, costs of incorporation and legal origin. 
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Table 10: Negative binomial regressions (2) – dependent variable: as Table 8 
Independent variables: Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Coefficients and 
significance  
Incorporation theory score 3.382 ** 2.105 ** 1.579 ** 
Territorial flexibility score -0.956  -0.656  -0.695  
Costs of incorporation 0.108 ** 0.102 ** 0.064 * 
Corporate tax rate -0.298 ** -0.0836  -0.076 * 
Rule of law 0.139  -0.449  -0.739 * 
Legal origin 0.706 * 0.750 ** 0.763 ** 
Official language 0.401  1.388 ** 1.172 ** 
Geographic distance -0.002 ** -0.001 ** -0.002 ** 
Population 8.04E-08 ** 5.75E-08 ** 3.60E-08 ** 
Multiplicator 0.685718  -0.162 ** -0.138 ** 
Migrants 7.79E-07  3.37E-06 * 3.22E-06 * 
Country dummies #  #  #  
Constant 0.833  -0.134  3.916  
Log pseudolikelihood -1714.925  -3172.266  -2865.744  
 n=297  n=756  n=729  
Note: ** significant at 1% level, * at 5% level;  
# dummy variables for the country of the managers (individual values not shown)  
To further check the robustness of the findings, Table 10 reports the regression results for the 
specification of model (1) for modified country groups. Model (4) examines the eleven 
countries with the most comprehensive data and model (5) does so for all 28 Member States 
(even the six countries with the very limited data). Model (6) excludes the UK as a possible 
outlier given that more than 50% of the foreign incorporations are registered in the UK (see 
3.1, above). It should be noted that this is a hypothetical scenario since in an EU without the 
UK, it may well have been the case that a Member State with a similar law (such as Ireland or 
Cyprus, also given the significance of the ‘legal origins’ variable in all of the models) would 
have taken the position of the UK as a popular target destination.24 
The main results are unchanged in all of the three models. In model (4), the lower 
significance level for some of the variables is likely to be due to the lower number of 
observations. In models (4) and (6) it is however also interesting to note that the variable on 
the corporate tax rate is now statistically significant, with the expected negative sign. In 
addition, in model (6) the negative significance of the rule of law variable is likely to be due 
to the popularity of some of the CEE countries as popular target destinations (see Table 2 in 
3.1, above). 
It can be speculated that the lower rule of law score of a country may not always be against 
the interest of companies since it may go hand in hand with lighter requirements in terms of 
doing business. In this sense, model (4) may indicate a form of ‘market segmentation’, 
similar to the situation in the US (Barzuza, 2012; for Europe see also Zorzi, 2017): businesses 
                                                 
24 Indeed, it can now already be seen that, following the Brexit referendum, some of the incorporation agents 
promote Irish companies as an alternative to UK ltds, see, eg, https://go-ahead.de/; www.limited-kaufen.com/. 
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which only aim at reducing the initial incorporation costs do so in the UK, while those which 
also aim at reducing taxation (and have a general preference for laxer laws) incorporate in 
other Member States. 
The importance of differences in conflict of laws rules has also been confirmed in a 
corresponding empirical survey of lawyers from all Member States (Gerner-Beuerle et al., 
2016: 65-99). Its main finding is that, despite the case law of the Court of Justice, there are 
reported to be significant practical obstacles to corporate mobility in Europe. This shows in 
many of the survey answers and holds true for both the aggregate level of the responses and 
the analyses of the responses for particular groups of respondents. It also correlates with the 
fact that most of the survey respondents expressed support for EU harmonisation of conflict 
of laws rules applicable to companies. 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical research about corporate mobility in the EU has so far been limited in two 
respects: it has been focused on the analysis of foreign-based companies in the UK and it has 
mainly been concerned with differences in the costs of incorporation. This paper had the aim 
to fill these gaps. 
In the descriptive statistics, based on data from all EU Member States, we confirmed that the 
UK is the most popular target destination. To a lesser extent, foreign incorporations also take 
place in other Member States. In particular, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech 
Republic are popular target destinations within Central and Eastern Europe. However, the 
network analysis of these data also showed that the foreign incorporations typically happen 
between neighbouring countries with further linguistic, social and economic similarities; thus, 
the effect of the freedom of establishment on the mobility of companies across all Member 
States is still rather limited. The times-series data of new incorporations in the UK also points 
towards the limited effect of the case law of the Court of Justice. Finally, the regression 
analysis suggests that decisions about domestic or foreign incorporations are not merely a 
result of the differences in substantive company law, in particular the costs of incorporation. 
Rather, we found that conflict of laws rules plays a key role: countries that have a clear-cut 
version of the ‘incorporation theory’ attract more incorporations than countries which have 
retained elements of the ‘real seat theory’. 
These findings can have important policy implications. They show that the case law of the 
Court of Justice has not made all differences in the conflicts of laws rules applicable to 
companies obsolete. Thus, a possible reading of these findings is that harmonisation of those 
rules may be recommended. This is a position which may also be endorsed by the EU 
Commission as it considers proposing a new European instrument to harmonise these conflict 
of laws rules.25 The significant relationship between the ‘pureness’ of the incorporation 
theory and the use of a Member State’s companies by foreign incorporators also shows that 
EU harmonisation based on the incorporation theory would facilitate corporate mobility as 
one of the relevant policy considerations in this area (notwithstanding possible other 
considerations, see Gerner-Beuerle et al., 2016: 275-351).  
                                                 
25 See the consultation ‘EU Company law upgraded: Rules on digital solutions and efficient cross-border opera-
tions’ (10 May 2017), available at http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/just/item-detail.cfm?item_id=58190. 
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Following the result of the UK’s ‘Brexit referendum’ from June 2016, it is possible that, after 
the eventual departure of the UK from the EU, the dynamics will change (see also Armour et 
al., 2017). For example, it could be suggested that other Member States will aim to fill the 
gap that will be left by the UK as the ‘European Delaware’. However, it is also possible that 
the UK keeps strong ties with the EU: if the EU and the UK agree on arrangements similar to 
those in place between the EU and Switzerland, there will be no necessary change to the 
position of foreign companies incorporated in the UK (and vice versa). Yet, even if the UK 
decided for a looser arrangement, it may be the case that a future free trade arrangement 
would also cover the free movement of companies (cf. Sørensen, 2016). Thus, while the 
present paper certainly is not be the final word on matters of corporate mobility in the EU, it 
points towards the continuing need for empirically sound law-making in this field. 
Acknowledgments 
We gratefully acknowledge funding from the EU Commission (DG Justice) for the 
underlying Study on the Law Applicable to Companies 2016. We are also grateful for 
comments received in the course of presentations of earlier versions of this work at the 
Conference on Empirical Legal Studies in Europe (CELSE) in Amsterdam, the Annual 
Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE) in Bologna, the 
Annual Conference of the International Corporate Governance Society (ICGS) in Rome, the 
6th CECL Conference on ‘Company Law Reform in Central and Eastern Europe’ in Warsaw, 
SOAS University of London, the Law & Economics Workshop at King’s College London, 
the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, HEC 
Paris, the Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics (ACLE) and meetings with the study’s 
steering committee in London. The remaining errors are entirely our responsibility. 
Bibliography 
Armour, J., Fleischer, H., Knapp, V., Winner, M. 2017. ‘Brexit and Corporate Citizenship’, 
European Business Organization Law Review 18: 225-249. 
Armour, J. 2005. ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EC Legislation versus Regulatory 
Competition’, Current Legal Problems 58: 369-413. 
Barzuza, M 2012. ‘Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free 
Jurisdiction’, Virginia Law Review 98: 935-1000.  
Bech-Bruun and Lexidale 2013, Study on the Application of the Cross-Border Mergers 
Directive, prepared by for EU Commission, DG MARKT. 
Becht, M., Mayer, C., Wagner, H. 2008. ‘Where Do Firms Incorporate? Deregulation and the 
Cost of Entry’, Journal of Corporate Finance 14: 241-256. 
Becht, M., Enriques, L., Korom, V.E. 2009. ‘Centros and the Cost of Branching’, Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 9: 171-199.  
Biermeyer, T., Meyer, M. 2018. ‘Cross-border Corporate Mobility in the EU: Empirical 
Findings 2017’, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3116042. 
28 
 
Braun, R., Eidenmüller, H., Engert, A., Hornuf, L. 2013. ‘Does Charter Competition Foster 
Entrepreneurship? A Difference-in-Difference Approach to European Company Law 
Reforms’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51: 399-415. 
Coxe, S., West S.G., Aiken L.S. 2009. ‘The Analysis of Count Data: A Gentle Introduction to 
Poisson Regression and Its Alternatives’, Journal of Personality Assessment 91: 121-136. 
Dammann, J.C., Schündeln, M. 2013. ‘Where Are Limited Liability Companies Formed? An 
Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Law and Economics 55: 741-791. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. 2003. ‘Courts’, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 118: 453-517. 
Eidenmüller, H., Engert, A., Hornuf, L. 2010. ‘How Does the Market React to the Societas 
Europaea?’, European Business Organization Law Review 11: 35-50. 
Eurodad 2015. Fifty Shades of Tax Dodging. The EU’s Role in Supporting an Unjust Global 
Tax System, Brussels: Eurodad.  
Ferligoj, A., Doreian, P., Batagelj, V. 2011. ‘Positions and Roles’, in J. Scott and P.J. 
Carrington (eds.) The SAGE Handbook of Social Network Analysis, London: Sage. 
Fluck Z., Mayer, C. 2005. ‘Race to the Top or Bottom? Corporate Governance, Freedom of 
Reincorporation and Competition in Law’, Annals of Finance 1: 349-378. 
Garcia-Bernardo J., Fichtner, J., Takes, F.W., Heemskerk, E.M. 2017. ‘Uncovering Offshore 
Financial Centers: Conduits and Sinks in the Global Corporate Ownership Network’, 
Scientific Reports 7, Article number: 6246. 
Gerner-Beuerle, C., Schuster, E. 2014. ‘The Costs of Separation: Conflicts in Company and 
Insolvency Law in Europe’, Journal of Corporate Law Studies 14: 287-332. 
Gerner Beuerle. C., Mucciarelli, F., Schuster, E., Siems, M. 2016. Study on the Law 
Applicable to Companies: Final Report, Report for EU Commission, DG Justice. 
Gerner Beuerle. C., Mucciarelli, F., Schuster, E., Siems, M. 2018a. ‘Cross-border 
Reincorporations in the European Union: The Case for Comprehensive Harmonisation’, 
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 18: 1-42.  
Gerner Beuerle. C., Mucciarelli, F., Schuster, E., Siems, M. (eds.) 2018. The Private 
International Law of Companies in Europe, Munich and Oxford: C.H. Beck/Nomos/Hart 
Publishing, forthcoming. 
Harrell, F.E. 2015. Regression Modeling Strategies With Applications to Linear Models, 
Logistic and Ordinal Regression, and Survival Analysis, 2nd edn, Cham: Springer. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. 2008. ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal 
Origins’, Journal of Economic Literature 46: 285-332. 
Laamanen, T., Simula, T., Torstila S. 2012. ‘Cross-Border Relocations of Headquarters in 
Europe’, Journal of International Business Studies 43: 187-210. 
29 
 
Long, J. S, Freese, J. 2001. Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using 
Stata, College Station: Stata Press. 
Maisto, G. (ed.) 2009. Residence of Companies Under Tax Treaties and EC Law, 
Amsterdam: IBFD. 
Mucciarelli, F. 2012. ‘The Function of Corporate Law and the Effects of Reincorporations in 
the U.S. and the E.U.’, Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law 20: 421-468. 
Muller, P., Devnani, S., Ladher, R., Ramada, P. 2013. European Added Value Assessment on 
a Directive on the cross-border transfer of company seats (14th Company Law Directive), 
Annex II: Economic and Social Effects of the Requested Legislative Instrument - Research 
paper by London Economics, Brussels. 
Ringe, W.G. 2013. ‘Corporate Mobility in the European Union – a Flash in the Pan? An 
Empirical Study on the Success of Lawmaking and Regulatory Competition’, European 
Company and Financial Law Review 10: 230-267. 
Sick, S. 2015. ‘Der deutschen Mitbestimmung entzogen: Unternehmen mit ausländischer 
Rechtsform nehmen zu’ Mitbestimmungsförderung, Report February 2015, available at 
www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_mbf_report_2015_8.pdf. 
Siems, M. 2008. Convergence in Shareholder Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Siems, M. 2016. ‘Varieties of Legal Systems: Towards a New Global Taxonomy’, Journal of 
Institutional Economics 12: 579-602. 
Sørensen, K.E. 2015 ‘The Fight Against Letterbox Companies in the Internal Market’, 
Common Market Law Review 52: 85-118. 
Sørensen, K.E. 2016. ‘Free Movement of Companies under the New EU Free Trade 
Agreements’, European Company Law 13: 46-55. 
Teichmann, C., Knaier, R. 2015. ‘Experiences with the Competition of Regulators – a 
German Perspective’, in A.J. Viera González and C. Teichmann (eds.), Private Company 
Law reform in Europe: The Race for Flexibility, Cizur Menor: Aranzadi, Thomson Reuters. 
UNCTAD 2015. World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment 
Governance, New York: UN. 
Ventoruzzo, M., Conac, P.-H., Goto, G., Mock, S., Notari, M., Reisberg, A. 2015. 
Comparative Corporate Law, St. Paul, MN: West Academic. 
Winkelmann, R. 2008. Econometric Analysis of Count Data, 5th ed., Berlin, Springer. 
Zorzi, A. 2017. ‘A European Nevada? Bad Enforcement as an Edge in State Competition for 
Incorporations’, European Business Organization Law Review 18: 251-272. 
